Note that I have grouped these objections into five categories. The first constitute a highly emotionally charged group that includes yuk, horror, offence, disgust, unnaturalness, the playing of God and hubris. Then come four clearly moral categories-those concerned with autonomy (in which for reasons given later I have included dignity); those concerned with harm; those concerned with benefit; and those concerned with justice of one sort or another, whether in the sense of simply treating people equally, of just allocation of inadequate resources, of just respect for people's rights, or in the sense of legal justice and the obeying of morally acceptable laws.
Two types of cloning have generated particular moral concern: the first involves taking a cell from a human embryo and growing it into a genetically identical embryo and beyond; the second, made famous by the creation of 'Dolly' the sheep6, involves taking out the nucleus of one cell and putting into the resulting sac, or cell wall, the nucleus of another cell to be cloned. Strictly the 'Dolly-type clone' is not quite a clone because the cell wall also contributes a few genes, the mitochondrial genes, which are incorporated into the resulting organism, but the vast majority of the genes in a Dolly-type clone come from the nucleus, so that, for example, if a nucleus from one of my cells were implanted into a cell sac from someone else, and the resulting cell were grown into a human being, he would have a gene complement almost but not entirely identical to mine. On the other hand, clones that result from splitting off of cells from embryos and growing them have exactly the same gene content as the embryo from which they came. With either of these cloning techniques, the process can be carried to early stages of development for a variety of potentially useful purposes, without any intention or prospect of producing a developed human being (lumped together here as non-reproductive human cloning and referred to only in passing). The human cloning that produces the greatest concern, and is the main subject of this paper, is of course reproductive human cloning, which would aim to produce a human person with the same genes as some other human being.
HUBRIS, YUK, ETC. First, then, the group of responses based on yuk, it's unnatural, it's against one's conscience, it's intuitively J R Soc Med 1999;92: [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] H-0 3 repellent, it's playing God, it's hubris a group of responses that one hears very frequently. I have to admit that this sort of essentially emotional response tends to evoke a negative emotional response in me when it is used in moral argument, as it often is (by moral argument I mean, following David Raphael7, argument about what is good or bad, what is right or wrong, what ought or ought not to be done and about our values and norms). The trouble is that these gut responses may be morally admirable, but they may also be morally wrong, even morally atrocious, and on their own such gut responses do not enable us to distinguish the admirable from the atrocious. Think of the moral gut responses of your favourite bigots for example, the ones who feel so passionately that homosexuality is evil, that black people are inferior, that women should be subservient to men, that Jews and Gypsies and the mentally retarded or mentally ill ought to be exterminated. People have existed some still exist who have these strong 'gut beliefs' which they believe to be strong moral feelings, which indeed they believe to be their consciences at work; and my point here is that gut responses provide no way for us to distinguish those moral feelings that we know or strongly believe to be wrong, from the moral feelings that we ourselves have, which we know or strongly believe to be right. To discriminate between emotional or gut responses, or indeed between the promptings of deeply felt moral intuitions or of conscience, we must reflect, think, analyse, in order to decide whether particular moral feelings are good or bad, whether they should lead to action or whether they should be suppressed (and yes, I think moral reflection shows that it is important to suppress, or even better re-educate so as to change, one's moral feelings when on analysis one finds they are wrong). Without such moral reflection the feeling itself, while it may be an important flag that warns us to look at the issues it concerns, is no more than that. With such reflection we may find that the flag is signalling an important moral perspective that we should follow; or we may find that the flag is signalling us to respond in a morally undesirable way.
An analogy which I like to use concerns medical practice. Doctors, especially surgeons, cut people up quite a lot; they (we) also stick their fingers in people's bottoms. Most of us, I imagine, would feel quite deeply that both of those activities are rather disgusting and not to be done; yet we know, through thought and reflection in our medical studies, that we had better overcome these deep feelings because in some circumstances it is right to cut people and in some circumstances it is right to put our fingers in people's bottoms. Both are extraordinary and counterintuitive things to do, but on analysis we find that they are sometimes the right thing to do. The same need for reflection, thought and analysis applies to our deeply felt moral feelings in general. We need those deep moral feelings, those deep moral gut responses. Moral feelings are here we may agree with Hume8 the main springs or drivers of our moral action. They lead us to action against social injustice and corruption, against the tyrant, the torturer, the sadist, the rapist, the sexual aggressor of children but-and now I part company with Hume we need to reflect on and educate our moral feelings so as to select and develop the good ones, and deter and modify or preferably abolish the bad ones.
Brave New World
In the context of our deep feelings let's just remind ourselves about Huxley and his Brave New World9. It has become a trigger title, only needing utterance to provoke strong negative feelings, especially about the use of science and technology to control and predetermine people's feelings, attitudes and behaviour. From a rereading of Brave New World I was satisfied that Huxley's main target is not science and technology but rather their misapplication by the despotic state that systematically sets out to undermine the possibility of freedom-freedom in the sense of humanity's ability to make thought-out choices and live by them, autonomous freedom. But while Orwell, in his Nineteen Eighty-Four imparted to us a horror of tyrannical social control, of 'big brother is watching you', Huxley with Brave New World is more commonly perceived to have patterned our thoughts and feelings against 'runaway science' and especially against genetics and the artificial reproduction of embryos, fetuses and babies away from their mothers, so as to control every aspect of their development. Recall, as an example itself of conditioning (of Huxley's readers), the ghastly example early on in which babies are naturally attracted to books and to flowers, and then, to ensure that the particular class of worker that the babies are destined to become will detest flowers and books, are subjected to nasty noises, terrifying explosions, sirens, alarm bells and finally, to make sure, electric shocks. Two We will return to Brave New World, but I do not think we need Huxley's warnings about childhood conditioning of our attitudes and beliefs and prejudices to know that, even in our ordinary lives, many of our strong attitudes and prejudices and beliefs have emerged as a result of childhood patterning. We have been programmed to some extent into our attitudes. The big difference, of course, is that as we grow up and are educated we are able to reflect on these attitudes and beliefs and to decide whether to own them or reject them. Nonetheless many of our deep moral attitudes and beliefs are firmly embedded from early childhood (as the book of Proverbs reminds us 'Train up a child in the way he should go: and when he is old he will not depart from it') and, even if we decide that some of them are wrong, we have to work very hard if we want to change them. Huxley in Brave New World warns against despotic misuse of science and technology that, by painfully embedding attitudes and feelings in early infancy, and by later social prohibition or discouragement of reflection about those attitudes, makes the development of moral agency impossible or at least extremely difficult.
However, we have not been the recipients of such state conditioning and control in our own societies and I find it difficult to understand the strength and depth and origins of the contemporary widespread hostility to the very idea of cloning human beings. Certainly the existence of contemporary nature's own human clones, identical twins, seems harmless enough not to account for such deep hostility to the idea of deliberate cloning, though in passing it may be relevant to note that, down the ages, twins have been mysteriously subject to ambivalent prejudices. Thus, apart from literary and dramatic jokes about them from the comedies of Plautus via Shakespeare to Stephen Sondheim, twins and their mothers have been persecuted in some societies, revered but also feared in others, for example as unnatural miscegenated offspring of gods. On the other hand, there may be quite strongly positive attitudes to twins. Wendy Doniger in a review in the London Review of Books10 quotes from Lawrence Wright's work on twins on 'the common fantasy that any one of us might have a clone, a Doppelganger; someone who is not only a human mirror, but also an ideal companion; someone who understands me perfectly, almost perfectly, because he is me, almost me.
We will return to the issue of identity, because the myth that genetic identity equals personal identity lies at the root of much misunderstanding about cloning. First, let us pursue in more detail the argument that cloning is unnatural and therefore wrong. What role does 'unnatural' play in moral argument? Our first requirement is to disambiguate the term-what do we mean by unnatural in this context? Anything that occurs in nature could be said to be natural, but that sense of natural is not going to do much moral work for us, for we and what we do are natural, not unnatural, in this sense. In any case, right and wrong, good and bad, in so far as they occur in nature, also are equally natural in this sense, so that to say that something is natural will hardly help us distinguish between the two. Another sense of natural means unaffected by human intervention. But unless we wish to argue that all human interventions are bad and or wrong and all states of nature are good and/or right, then this sense of natural too is not much help for moral judgment. Think of all the truly horrible and morally undesirable things that occur in nature uninfluenced by humans; think too of all the human interventions in nature that are clearly morally desirable, but 'unnatural' in this sense-including all medical interventions, and all the other activities by which we help each other, including the provision of food, housing, clothing and heating.
But there are two more senses of unnatural that are of moral relevance. The first is that it is part of human nature to be a moral agent (with perhaps a few exceptions) and thus human people who behave immorally or even amorally are acting unnaturally in this sense of acting against their human nature. I personally find this theme of enormous moral importance and a way of linking theological natural law theory with secular morality. But it does not afford us any simple basis or method for moral assessment instead it demands assessment of what the moral part of our human nature requires of us. So 'natural' in this sense, important though it is as a moral concept, does not give us a way of deciding whether cloning and the other genetics activities are good or bad it simply requires us to make such distinctions. Like the objections based on the 'yuk response', the deep moral intuition, the moral repugnance and the claim of conscience, the objection that cloning is unnatural, when used in this morally plausible sense, requires moral reflection and judgment, but does not itself provide that moral reflection and judgment. If-but only if-such reflection and judgment lead us to conclude that cloning is immoral then we can say that cloning is unnatural in this morally relevant sense of going against our moral nature.
There is another sense of unnatural which I think is also of potential moral relevance. If we do something that weakens, undermines, destroys or harms our human moral nature, then this is immoral and unnatural in the sense of anti-natural or against nature; and that of course is of enormous moral significance not just in relation to cloning but for the whole of the new genetics enterprise. So, to show that any activity, such as cloning, is unnatural in a morally relevant sense we need to give reasons that demonstrate why it is contrary to our human moral nature, or why it will undermine that human moral nature. Until we can give such reasons let us be particularly careful to avoid pejorative claims about cloning being unnatural, not simply for the reasons I have just given, but also because it must be very hurtful for the world's identical twins to hear that they, by association, are considered to be 'unnatural' and therefore that their existence is morally undesirable.
To continue with this range of somewhat mysterious objections to cloning and sometimes to the new genetics as a whole, we need to look now at hubris and playing God.
Hubris is a pejorative term meaning a contemptuous arrogance, especially against God or the gods. 'Playing at God' combines both an implicit accusation of hubris with an implicit accusation of immaturity and lack of skill as when children play doctors, somewhat inefficiently. Suffice it to agree that contempt, arrogance, puerile immaturity and lack of skill are all morally undesirable in one fulfilling a responsible task. But are these accusations justifiably made against the whole enterprise of human cloning, or indeed against the whole enterprise of the new genetics? One would require specific cases and examples rather than sweeping generalizations, which otherwise boil down to mere abuse. There clearly is an important moral issue here, especially in relation to the question of whether at present we can safely and sufficiently skilfully carry out reproductive cloning, even if we wish to do so, and I shall return to this. But, without specific evidence, it seems straightforwardly tendentious to brand the whole enterprise of human cloning, let alone the whole of the new genetics, as 'hubris' and 'playing God'.
AUTONOMY AND PERSONAL IDENTITY
The next set of objections against cloning concerns personal identity and dignity, the undermining of autonomy, of individuality, of personality, of uniqueness, the production of carbon copies, photocopies, stencils and fakes of human beings.
Even if reproductive cloning were to produce a person cloned, it is not clear to me why this should be immediately condemned as morally unacceptable, though the idea so greatly strains the imagination that one might argue that it would be irresponsible to try any such trick even if it were possible. But of course reproductive cloning would not produce two identical people only two people with identical (or in the case of 'Dolly-type cloning' near identical) sets of genes. Genetic identity neither means nor entails personality identity. Once again the proof of this exists all around us, for genetically identical twins are obviously different people, even though their genes are identical or near identical (in a type-type sense of identity, such that billiard balls are typetype identical, even though each billiard ball is token identical only with itself). But this genetic type-type identity of people who are clones does not make them identical as people, in either sense. Some commentators make a different criticism. It is not only personal identity that must not be replicated; nor must genetic identity, for that itself is morally important, indeed even a right according to the European Parliament. They assert that every one of us has a right to his or her own genetic identity. Here there seems to be serious confusion or conflation between token identity, type-type identity and uniqueness. On analysis the claim surely cannot be that we all have a right to our genetic identity in the sense of token identity (every thing being token identical with itself and with nothing else), for that is simply an analytic truth. We all, including identical twins, necessarily do have that sort of genetic token identity, and if it is not incoherent to describe this definitional truth as a right, it is certainly pointless. But if the claim is made in terms of type-type identity, whereby we are claimed to have a right to typetype genetic identity, then identical twins and any other human clones do have such genetic identity; that is precisely the sort of identity that they have (or near identity in the case of Dolly-type cloning). So presumably it is not genetic identity that the European Parliament can sensibly be claiming as a right. Perhaps instead it is genetic exclusivity or uniqueness. If I have such a right, then no-one else is entitled to have the (type-type) identical genes that I have. It might be described as a claim right that one's genetic identity, in the sense of token identity, must be unique in other words, a claim right not to have type-type genetic identity. But if that is the European Parliament's claim it is not merely bizarre; if taken seriously it is morally malignant, for it implies morally malignant consequences for identical twins, nature's existing examples of people who are clones. If we have this right to genetic uniqueness, then somebody must have the corresponding duty the duty to destroy one of each pair of existing identical twins, both born and in utero. Fortunately such counter-examples, identical with the person from whom he or she were Vo u me 92 i an uary 1 999 plus the general tendency of morally reflective peoplc to be morally and legally unconcerned about the lack of genetic uniqueness of identical twins, indicate that genetic uniqueness is unlikely, pace the European Parliament, to be of moral importance, let alone a moral right, and still less a right that ought to be enshrined in law.
But maybe there is a difference between cloning that occurs naturally and cloning that occurs by intention? Perhaps it is deliberate cloning that is the problem, rather than the cloning that occurs naturally, in the sense of unmediated by human beings? And perhaps the problem is that such deliberate reproductive cloning somehow demeans human dignity? Certainly both the World Health Organization and the European Parliament have stated that such cloning would offend against human dignity. Well, once again we need to know what we mean by human dignity. We all know that human dignity is good and ought to be promoted and respected, but most of us, I suspect, would find it very difficult to say what we actually mean by human dignity and to explain why its violation is wrong.
The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary offers definitions such as 'the quality of being worthy or honourable... worth, excellence.. . high estate, position or estimation... .honour, rank' definitions that indicate that to say that someone has dignity is to say that he or she is valued. But with this sort of understanding of 'dignity', to say that cloning violates or offends against human dignity is simply to assert that it diminishes worth without in any way explaining why this should be so. Interestingly the Encyclopedia of Philosophy the Encyclopedia of Bioethics and the Dictionary of Medical Ethics all lack entries under 'dignity'. Those who wish to use infringement of human dignity as an argument against human reproductive cloning thus need to explain what they mean by the term. For me the most plausible account of human dignity is Immanuel Kant's. For him human dignity resides in our ability to be autonomous, to will or choose to act according to the moral lawl 1. I suspect that many uses of the term 'human dignity' are consistent with this Kantian notion that our human dignity is our ability to make autonomous choices for ourselves according to what we believe to be right. If so, when we commit ourselves to respecting human dignity, to treating others in ways that respect their human dignity, we mean roughly that we should treat them in ways that they themselves on reflection and deliberation would believe to be good or right ways; and that when we make decisions on behalf of people who cannot make their own decisions, we should try so far as we can to replicate the decisions they themselves would have autonomously chosen (or if they have not yet become autonomous, can be expected and desired to make were they autonomous). Now this is a speculation about our concept of dignity and if that is not what you mean then please write a short piece, even a your account of human dignity, because existing appeals to infringement of human dignity, though popular, tend to be somewhat opaque.
If we accept some version of the Kantian meaning of human dignity and its basis in autonomous choice, then it is not at all clear to me why reproductive cloning should in any way undermine such dignity. Of course there might be ways of destroying or damaging that dignity by damaging the underlying genetic basis for such autonomous choice and any such activity should be morally condemned precisely because of the damage to human dignity, a version of the reputable anti-human-nature argument above. But no reason has been offered for accusing reproductive human cloning of damaging human dignity in this way.
Another objection to cloning that may also reside in the notion of human dignity is that we must never treat other people merely as means to an end, but always as ends in themselves one of the versions of Kant's categorical imperativell. This claim is frequently misrepresented as a moral obligation never to use each other as means to an end, or as instruments or as tools or as objects. That misrepresentation is plainly wrong, for of course we morally can and morally do frequently use each other as means to an end, as tools, and it is highly desirable that we should continue to do so. If I ask you to bend forwards so that I can climb on your back in order to get over my garden wall to let myself in through the kitchen window because I have lost my key, I am using you as a means to my end, as an object, a sort of step-ladder, an instrument or a tool. But I am not treating you merely as an object or a tool or an instrument. By asking and obtaining your permission I am treating you as an end in yourself as well as treating you as a means to my end. The issue is complicated with embryos because it is a matter of unresolved and passionate moral debate whether embryos and fetuses are within the scope of the Kantian requirement to treat each other as ends in themselves. Many of us believe that they are not, and thus would permit for example the cloning of human embryos for research purposes with disposal (i.e. destruction) of the experimented-on embryo at an early stage in its development. In the UK the law allows this sort of thing. On the other hand, many others would say that this is morally outrageous because the human embryo does fall within the scope of the Kantian categorical imperative, being itself a human person from the moment of its creation. I am not going to address that argument, but it is important to see how it complicates the issue of cloning, both sorts of cloning. For if in creating an embryo, by whatever method, we have created a person, then of course we must treat it as a person, and thus not use it merely as a means to an end. If, on the other hand, it is not yet a person letter, to this journal or the Journal ofMedical Ethics and give 7 then we may use it merely as a means to an end, as a research tool for example, and destroy it after such use. That is an unresolved philosophical and/or theological problem.
Suppose, however, we put aside that piece of the argument and revert to human reproductive cloning, then the requirement always to treat people as ends in themselves, even when we also treat them as means, is entirely compatible with reproductive cloning. The issue surely turns, not on the method of reproduction, cloning or otherwise, that one may choose, but rather on how one actually treats and regards the child that results. Take the example of parents who seek to clone a child because they want to have another child with the same blood or marrow type, so that they can transplant some marrow from the new child into an existing child mortally ill with leukaemia. Such a process would necessarily involve, it is often claimed, treating the new child merely as a means. Not at all, I would counter-argue. The argument needs to be broken down into two parts. The first part concerns the question, why do and ought people decide to have children? In particular, is there any moral obligation to have a child only for the sake of the child-to-be? If so, then surely the vast majority of parents have behaved immorally, for while there must be many different reasons for having a child, I doubt that there exist very many parents who have decided to have a child because they decided there was now a need to have a new person in the world to whom duties were owed that he or she should exist. Much more commonly (and yes this is mere supposition) people decide to have a child because they want a child for their own reasons or, perhaps more commonly, instincts. They feel like it, or they are ready to have children, or they want to fill a gap in their lives, or perhaps they want an heir, or someone to take over the business, or someone to look after them in their old age; all sorts of personal selfish reasons may operate, or none at all. My argument is that, until shown otherwise, we should accept that there is nothing wrong with making either a self-interested or an instrumental decision to have a child.
Having implemented such a decision, the second stage of the argument applies, for now of course mere self interest can no longer be justified. Once there is another person created as a result of one's decision, then that person must be accorded the same moral respect as is due to all people and must not be treated merely as a means to an end, an object, a tool, an instrument. So while one may perfectly properly decide to have a child in order to provide a source of life-saving cord blood or marrow for one's existing child, one must of course then respect the new child as an end and never treat him or her merely as a means to an end. I can see no reason for the parents' instrumental motivation for having a child in any way necessitating their treatment of anything, I suspect that human psychological nature would tend to lead parents to treat such children even more lovingly and respectfully than usual. I have given reasons for doubting that cloning would infringe the human dignity and autonomy of the cloned person. Let us now consider the dignity and autonomy of those who wish to engage in reproductive cloning. Such considerations favour non-interference on the grounds that in general people's autonomous choices for themselves should be respected, unless there are very strong moral reasons against doing so, and that this is particularly true in respect of those rather personal and private areas of choice, notably those concerning reproduction, sexuality, choice of partners, and decisions about babies. Intervention by the state, or anyone else, in these areas of private morality undermines the human dignity/autonomy of those people. Moreover, respect for people's dignity/autonomy in these areas is not only right in itself, but is also likely to lead to far greater overall good and far less harm than if we start erecting state apparatuses for intervention in these private areas. I think this is Huxley's main message in Brave New World. Do not let government start to control our private decisions, our autonomy or our development. Do not let the apparatus for state control in these areas be developed. By leaving such choices decentralized not only will people's dignity/autonomy be respected a good in itself but human welfare generally will benefit. Similarly, beware state control of science and technology, for in the name of social order it will lead to the end of liberty. As Huxley later admits, this is an overstated case, and I am certainly not arguing for total libertarianism and absence of state controls either of citizens' behaviour or of science and technology. But I am arguing against excessive state control, and in favour of a substantial zone of respect by the state for private autonomous choices where such respect does not entail harm to others. And so I think was Huxley.
HARMS AND BENEFITS
Which brings us to the next group of arguments, based on the harms and benefits of cloning. Let us briefly examine these in relation to the people cloned, their families, their societies and future generations. It is in the context of the social and personal harms of human reproductive cloning that Brave New World (and also the Ira Levin book of 1976. Boysfrom Brazil, in which clones of Hitler are bred in an attempt to rekindle the Nazi enterprise) has done so much to turn us against cloning, even succeeding in rendering the term pejorative. What was common to both of those books, but was especially evident in Huxley's novel, was that the cloning they described involved either selection of already the new child merely as a means and not an end. If Volume 92 J an uary 1 999 impaired humanity for cloning (e.g. Levin and the cloning of Hitlers) or the deliberate impairment of human embryos before they were cloned, as in Huxley's 'Bokanovsky's Process'.
'Essentially', the director of hatcheries and conditioning explains, bokanovskification, or cloning, 'consists of a series of arrests of development'-arrests by chilling the embryo, by X-raying it, by adding alcohol and by oxygen starvation. When one of the students bravely asks what the benefit was of this process, 'the Director wheeled sharply round, "can't you see, can't you see?" He raised a hand; his expression solemn. "Bokanovsky's Process is one of the major instruments of social stability. . Ninety-six identical twins working ninety-six identical machines! . . . You really know where you are. For the first time in history." He quoted the planetary motto: "Community, Identity, Stability". Grand words. "If we could bokanovskify indefinitely, the whole problem would be solved" . . . standard Gammas, unvarying Deltas, uniform Epsilons... "But alas," the Director shook his head, "we can't bokanofskify indefinitely".' Note that Huxley has here combined and conflated three quite separate ideas. One is reproductive cloning; the second is a crude and simplistic genetic determinism (ascribed to the rulers of course and rejected by Huxley himself) whereby genetic identity equals personal identity; and the third is intervention in the cloning process to impair the normal development of the human embryo. But we have seen that cloning does not entail personal identity, and so far as we know cloning need not harm or impair the embryo.
But of course we do not yet know. Cloning by nuclear substitution has only just begun in mammals, with Dolly the sheep being one successful outcome out of 277 attempts to produce such a clone. Imagine that being done in human beings and the harms to the women producing the eggs and undergoing the unsuccessful implantations (as stated above, I am leaving unargued the issue of whether or not it is permissible to harm the human embryo itself for the purpose of such research).
Claims about the potential harms caused by human reproductive cloning are extensive. Animal experiments are reported to have produced many abnormal embryos and fetuses, many spontaneous abortions, and many abnormal births. Theoretical reasons are claimed to indicate that the offspring will be particularly prone to various diseases including those associated with premature ageing. Psychological harms are predicted for individual children thus born, including resentment at having their genetic structure predetermined by their parents, resentment at having been conceived merely as means to benefit others (for example as blood or bone marrow sources), a sense of overwhelming burden if they have been cloned from someone with great achievements that they are supposed to emulate; confusion about their personal identity and relationships (if, for example, they are clones of one of their parents). Physical and emotional harms are also predicted for women bearing cloned embryos, including the high rate of failure and abnormality of the pregnancies; and if the women are also surrogates even more emotional harms can be anticipated (a point made by my colleague Donna Dickenson).
In addition to the general social disasters noted above, as envisaged in books such as Brave New World and Boys from Brazil, contemporary concerns include undermining of social values by opening the doors to racist eugenics, encouragement of 'vanity, narcissism and avarice' as the US Commission on Bioethics has reported12, and the creation of 'a means of mass destruction' with 'science out of control' as the Nobel Laureate scientist Joseph Rotblat is reported to have claimed13. Add to all this the concern of the European Parliament about 'violation of the security of human genetic material', anticipated reduction in the genetic variability of the human race and the consequent threat to human evolution that the WHO is concerned about, and also worries about the geometric increase through germline inheritance of any mistakes that are created by cloning, and we see a wide range of anticipated harms that may result from cloning.
Once again we need to look at this range of harms rather more precisely. Let it be acknowledged immediately that at present the technique of human cloning is not well developed enough to be safely used in humans for reproduction, but this is not to acknowledge either that each of the preceding harm arguments is valid, or that the harm arguments that are currently valid are sufficiently strong to prevent further research into ways of reducing such harms for example, by animal experimentation.
What then of the formidable lists of harms, mainly psychological harms, anticipated to affect children? In brief, I think we need to set against these purported and anticipated psychological harms of being a clone child the very important counter-consideration of what is the alternative for that particular child? This argument commonly irritates, sometimes enrages, but rarely convinces. Yet it seems valid and I have not encountered plausible counter-arguments. The alternative for those children is not to exist at all, so if we are genuinely looking at the interests of those children who are anticipated to have the various psychological problems of being clones, and the difficulties that undoubtedly we can anticipate those will raise, and if we are genuinely looking at those problems from the point of view of the child, then the proper question to ask is what is preferable for that child? To exist but to have those problems or not to exist at all? It is an argument that I learned from the so-called Pro Life movement, though I suspect this is not a use that they themselves would wish to make of it. I found that the argument radically changed the way I thought about anticipated harms. Of course, it in no way stops one from deciding, for example, not to have a baby, or to have an abortion, or not to pursue reproductive cloning. But it does force one, or should force one, to realize that one's reasons are unlikely to be the best interests of the child whom one is thinking of not having, but are instead one's own reasons and preferences, largely about the sort of world one wishes to participate in creating. And if that is the case, why should one s own reasons and preferences prevail over the reasons and preferences of those who do wish to carry out reproductive cloning? After all, they do not claim a right to prevent us from reproducing according to our preferences; why should we claim a right to prevent them from reproducing according to their preferences?
As for the arguments about the potential social harms of cloning, other than those based on safety of the techniques, it seems to me that they are either frankly implausible (the argument that cloning is a threat to further human evolution surely falls into this category, given the likely numbers of cloned versus more conventionally produced people); too weak to justify imposition on those who reject them (for instance the arguments that reproductive cloning encourages vanity, narcissism and avarice); or powerful but misdirected. Thus it is not cloning, nor the techniques of the new genetics more broadly considered, that might lead to the social harms of racism, eugenics, mass destruction, or the violation of the security of genetic material, but rather social structures that permit dictatorships and other forms of immorally enforced control of people's behaviour by their rulers. Those are the harms that we need to be concerned about; and the most important way of avoiding them-of avoiding oppression of all those who are oppressed by the strong, including the widespread oppression of women by men-is not to ban cloning or to become obsessed with the new genetics, but rather to reform those social structures that result in such harms and to maintain in good order those social structures that do largely avoid these harms.
What about the germ-line argument of dangers to future generations? Well certainly the genome resulting from reproductive cloning is germ-line transmissible and any mistakes that occur can be passed on to future generations. But so too, of course, can any benefits. If, for example, a cloning technique results in the elimination of some genetic abnormality that would otherwise have been transmitted through the germ-line, then the cascade effect is geometrically beneficial, just as, if a 'mistake' results and is passed on through the germ-line, that too is geometrically of the latter and maximize the chances of the former. But in general, with ever increasing voluntary personal control over reproduction, it seems likely that even if genetic 'mistakes' do occur, if they are severe people will be reluctant to pass them on to their offspring, thus reducing the risks of a cascade of negative genetic effects down the generations. On the other hand the precedent of deciding to prevent certain sorts of reproduction on the basis of the risk to future generations of deleterious genetic effects is itself one of the social harms enforced eugenics-that opponents of the new genetics are usually very keen to avoid. The current orthodoxy that somatic genetic interventions that are beneficial can be accepted but that germ-line interventions, even if clearly beneficial, should be forbidden seems to be one of those undefended taboos that need to be rejected. If we develop a genetic intervention that helps one offspring we need very good reasons for denying it to that offspring's offspring.
In general, and in relation to possible harms of new techniques, we need I believe to beware excessive concern with the 'precautionary principle'. In so far as it tells us to avoid doing harm, it is an important moral concern to balance against our continuing search for new ways of doing good of benefiting others. In other words, the principle of beneficence should always take into account the principle of non-maleficence, and the objective should be an acceptable probability of doing good with minimal and acceptable harm and risk of harm. But sometimes the precautionary principle is used as a sort of moral blunderbuss, like the use of primum non nocere when this is translated as 'above all do no harm'. That way lies a beneficence moratorium, with all applied medical research, indeed all new medical interventions, being banned, for whenever we seek to benefit we risk harming. The morally desirable use of the precautionary principle is to 'weigh' anticipated benefits and their probabilities against anticipated harms and their probabilities, always aiming at a likely outcome of net benefit with minimal and acceptable harm and risk of harm.
So what about the benefits? I have been able to find less in the published work about the potential benefits of reproductive human cloning than about its potential harms. The same is not true about non-reproductive human cloning, for which a wide variety of impressive potential benefits has been claimed. These include production of useful pharmaceuticals from cloned transgenic animals; basic research into DNA and aspects of genetics, human reproduction and infertility, ageing and oncogenesis; as well as the possible production of cloned human tissues and organs (for use, for example, in transplantation) 14. But even human reproductive cloning can be anticipated to provide certain benefits. For example, in rare cases Dolly-type cloning techniques could prevent inheritance of rare and inheritable. Clearly care is needed to minimize the chances disabling mitochondrial genetic disorders. The genetic lo0 abnormality being in the mitochondria, these cloning techniques make it possible to replace the cell membrane containing the defective mitochondria with an unaffected cell membrane and then to insert into that the unaffected genetic material in the cell nucleus. For the affected people such reproductive cloning could be of major benefit. A second potential benefit could arise where parents wish to have a further child, as already suggested, in order to provide, for example, compatible bone marrow or cord blood for an existing child who needs it to survive (I owe the cord blood example to Dr Matjaz Zwitter). A third example of potential benefit might be where a car crash has led to the death of a husband and the fatal injury of the only child and where the surviving woman wishes to have a clone from the child as the only means of raising a child who is her husband's biological offspring. A further potential benefit of reproductive cloning might be to a couple who are carriers of a fatal recessive gene and prefer to clone a cell from one of them to avoid the genetic danger, rather than reproduce by means of other people's genetic material.
Given the limited potential benefits of reproductive human cloning, the benefit/harm analysis does not seem at present to create much moral pressure to undertake this activity (though in non-reproductive cloning there certainly seem to be a large number of potential benefits, with far fewer potential harms). Nonetheless, given that there are some benefits that may be anticipated from reproductive human cloning, given the counter-arguments offered above to many of the claims that this would create major harms, and given the arguments from respect for reproductive and scientific autonomy, then at the very least we should thoroughly question contemporary absolutist proposals to ban human reproductive cloning for ever and a day even if prudence and precaution indicate a temporary ban until the safety of such techniques can be researched and developed. JUSTICE But do the last set of moral arguments against human reproductive cloning those based on justice lead us to require a permanent ban on the technique? Justice arguments can usefully be considered from the point of view of rights-based justice; of straightforward egalitarian justice (according to the European Parliament, cloning is contrary to the principle of human equality because it leads to eugenics and racism), of legal justice (the requirements of morally acceptable laws); and finally, and perhaps in this context most importantly, of distributive justice the fair or just distribution of scarce resources, including consideration of the opportunity costs of using such resources for one purpose rather than another.
The only rights-based arguments that I have found ban on human reproductive cloning fail and that most of the arguments for even a temporary ban fail. However, four to have a genetic identity a claim that I have examined above and found morally unacceptable in regard to identical twins. On the other hand, in favour of reproductive cloning are rights-based arguments claiming rights to reproductive autonomy and privacy and rights to carry out morally acceptable scientific research. Egalitarian theories of justice are fine (everyone should be treated equally) provided they pass the Aristotelian test for theories of justice-notably, that it is equals who should be treated equally, while those who are not equal in a morally relevant sense ought not to be treated equally but treated unequally in proportion to the morally relevant inequality. Thus, cloning does not treat everyone as equal if it is not done for everyone, but that is not unjust; for not everyone needs cloning and not everyone wants cloning. However, the European Parliament has claimed that cloning is contrary to human equality because it leads to eugenics and racism. Suffice it to say that, while both racism and imposed eugenics are morally unacceptable (though not the sort of 'eugenics' that stems from uncoerced reproductive choice, against which there are I believe no convincing moral arguments), there seem to be no reasons for believing that cloning is or entails either of these morally unacceptable phenomena. At best this is an empirical 'slippery slope' type of argument; and there seems no reason to believe that the slipperiness of this slope is so uncontrollable that we should never start down it.
Legal justice arguments require us at least primafacie to obey morally acceptable laws. I will simply assert that by this is meant laws that have been created in a morally acceptable manner, rather than laws whose content one morally approves. From this point of view we should obey the many laws that have now been passed in morally acceptable ways which ban reproductive human cloning. That in no ways settles the question of whether their moral content is morally desirable, and the bulk of this paper has been arguing that permanent bans on such cloning are not morally desirable and should be reversed.
Distributive justice arguments seem to offer the most plausible case against development of human reproductive cloning, or at least against funding such development from community funds, simply because the anticipated benefitharm ratio does not seem to justify the undoubted costs and especially the opportunity costs. But this argument does not rule out private funding of such research, nor does it result in a permanent ban on provision of state funding, should the anticipated benefits become substantially greater. CONCLUSION And so I conclude that all the arguments for a permanent against reproductive human cloning are based on the right I1I arguments in favour of a temporary ban do, I have indicated, currently succeed. The first is that at present the technique for human reproduction by cloning is simply not safe enough to be carried out in human beings. The second related argument is that, given these safety considerations, the benefits including respect for the autonomy of prospective parents and the scientists who would assist them, are at present insufficient to outweigh the harms. The third is the argument from distributive justice, but this is only sufficient to prescribe a low priority for state funding for human reproductive cloning. And finally, respect for autonomy within a democratic society requires adequate social debate before decisions are democratically made about socially highly contentious issues so a moratorium is also needed to provide time for this full social debate, and with luck for more informed, more deliberated and less frantic decisions.
The issues that underlie, and in my view are far more morally important than, the cloning debate and indeed much of the contemporary opposition to the new genetics are those that Huxley pointed to in Brave New World notably that both science and government must be used as servants of the people and not as our masters. This is something that Huxley explicitly addresses in the foreword to his 1946 edition of Brave New World, where he points out that if he had written the book again he would not have had just two alternatives essentially either the madness of state control or the madness of the savage's emotional and unreasoned lifestyle. He would also have included a middle way in which reason was used in pursuit of a reasonable life, in which science was applied for the benefit, for the eudaemonia or flourishing of human kind.
The second issue that underlies the cloning debate, and indeed the overall debate about the new genetics, and is of deep moral importance, is the need to protect the genetic underpinning of human autonomy and free will. Some such basis, however complex, there must be; and in pursuing any sort of human genetic research and development, safeguarding and protecting that genetic kernel of what, to embroider on Aristotle, is humanity's specific attribute, notably our autonomous rationality that must be the underlying moral challenge and moral imperative for the new genetics, along with its and our shared obligation to protect ourselves against the predations of the control freaks, whether they are the control freaks of state or religion or science or big business, or simply of crooked gangsters who seek to use us for their own ends. Those I think should be the central moral concerns in developing the new genetics, and that is the lesson that I have most vividly taken to heart from this excursus into the ethics of human reproductive cloning and from my re-reading of Aldous Huxley's Brave New World. But let us also not forget the origin of Huxley's title in Shakespeare's Tempest.
There the phrase does not have the negative connotations that Huxley has given it. Rather, Miranda is excited by the prospect of a new world of new people (and especially one wonderful new man), and a new life away from the tiny island on which she had been brought up and on which the only people she had ever seen till then were her father and Caliban. It is to the prospect of a new, more varied and fuller world and life that she wonderingly refers when she exclaims 'O brave new world, That has such people in't'. Like her and like Huxley in his 1946 preface I think we should look more positively at our brave new world the brave new world of genetics. We should learn Huxley's lessons, protect ourselves against the depredations of those who would unjustifiably control us, and realize that the potential problems lie less in cloning and genetics and more in politics and political philosophy and of course in their and our underlying ethics.
